General Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive Mechanism for
  Crowdsourcing Markets by Sun, Jiajun
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
54
17
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
3 N
ov
 20
13
General Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Incentive
Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Markets
Jiajun Sun
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China
Email: jiajunsun.bupt@gmail.com, mhd@bupt.edu.cn
Abstract—In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different
type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which
need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are
essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving
good task assignments, especially under a given budget constraint
condition. To this end, recently, Singer et al. propose a novel
class of auction mechanisms for determining near-optimal prices
of tasks for crowdsourcing markets constrained by the given
budget. Their mechanisms are very useful to motivate extensive
user to truthfully participate in crowdsourcing markets. Although
they are so important, there still exist many security and privacy
challenges in real-life environments. In this paper, we present
a general privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for
crowdsourcing markets with the budget constraint, not only to
exploit how to protect the bids and assignments’ privacy, and
the chosen winners’ privacy in crowdsourcing markets with
homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs and identity privacy
from users, but also to make the verifiable payment between
the platform and users for crowdsourcing applications. Results
show that our general privacy-preserving verifiable incentive
mechanisms achieve the same results as the generic one without
privacy preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, crowdsourcing markets have emerged as
an effective manner to address complex cognitive works. For
instance, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTU), as a platform,
enables the requesters to post tasks that are then conducted by
a large number of geographically distributed users. One of the
main challenge the platform faces is to provide appropriate
incentives for users. Specifically speaking, the platform needs
to establish rewards that are attractive to users, and yet result
in substantial finished jobs for crowdsoucing markets without
exceeding the budget.
To solve these issues, Singer et al. [1], [2] separately study
the auction mechanisms of crowdsourcing markets to incen-
tive user extensive participation under the two situations of
homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs. Their mechanisms
guarantee the truthful participation of a large number users by
determining near-optimal prices of tasks for crowdsourcing
market with the budget constraints. More importantly, the
mechanisms are incentive compatible, budget feasible, and
have competitive ratio performance and performs well in
practice, thereby ensure extensive user to truthfully submit
their bids to the crowdsourcing markets. Although they are
so promising, security and privacy issues, two critical human
factors in crowdsourcing markets, have not been fully explored
in the above protocols, which may make them impractical in
real-life complex scenarios. A common hypothesis made in
the above protocols is that the involved parties will follow the
protocols honestly and voluntarily. However, in order to maxi-
mize their utilities and protect their bids, assignments’ privacy
and identification privacy, some users could behave selfishly
and will not participate in crowdsourcing applications, which
thus violates the hypothesis and makes these well-designed
protocols inefficient. To this end, it is imperative to provide
some incentive strategies to stimulate extensive selfish users
to participate in crowdsourcing market applications.
In addition to the privacy issue, security issue is also
challenging in crowdsourcing markets. In order to deceitfully
decrease the payment to users, some controller of the platform
may misbehave, e.g., provide false results or insert a fictitious
bid and assignments just below the payment to the users [3],
[4]. If the correctness of the payment outcomes from the
platform is not well guaranteed, users will be still reluctant to
participate in crowdsourcing market applications. In practice,
since a ‘real world’ platform is operated by an individual
within a large corporation, or by a public servant within
a government department, the possibility of incorrectness
operations from the platform exists in crowdsourcing market
applications whenever the platform is not the owner of the
assignment jobs for purchase in crowdsourcing market applica-
tions, or the owner of the corporation that is seeking to procure
the assignment jobs. For example, the World Bank recently
estimated the volume of incorrect exchanging hands for public
sector procurement alone to roughly US$200 billion per year,
with the annual volume of the procurement projects tainted
by incorrect operations close to US$1.5 trillion. Thence, how
to deal with secure challenges is crucial for the success of
crowdsourcing market applications.
Although both security and privacy issues have been iden-
tified as two crucial human factors for realistic crowdsourcing
market applications in MSNs, many recent research works [5]–
[8] tend to separately study them in crowdsourcing market
applications. Even if most of existing incentive mechanisms
have also only tackled one or the other: they either offer
good privacy preservation, with correspondingly weak pay-
ment verification guarantees [5], or they preferably trade some
privacy for better payment verification guarantees [6]. But
they are are not applicable in realistic crowdsourcing market
applications, where users arrive online and the platform has
budget constraints. Therefore, how to simultaneously address
the security and privacy issues becomes particularly challeng-
2ing for realistic crowd sensing application in MSNs.
To tackle the above mentioned challenges, in this paper,
we first introduce two incentive mechanism for crowdsourc-
ing markets with homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs.
Then, we address their privacy preservation of users’ bids and
assignments by introducing the oblivious transfer respectively.
Furthermore, we design each stage’s threshold payment for ho-
mogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs respectively based on
the timed lapse cryptography services to protect users’ privacy.
Finally, we propose a verifiable mechanism for guaranteeing
the security of the payment from the platform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we briefly discuss the related work and motivation. In Section
III, we present our system model and our design goals. In
Section IV, we design a privacy-preserving verifiable incen-
tive mechanism for crowdsourcing markets with the budget
constraint, followed by the security analysis and performance
evaluation in V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In crowdsourcing market applications, selfish and privacy
preservation problems, two crucial human factors, have gained
extensive attentions. Most of reported research works have
focused on the selfish issue of incentive mechanisms for
crowdsourcing market applications. The authors of [9]–[11]
leverage traditional incentive mechanism such as the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and its variants to solve
users’ selfish issues. However, they do not consider the prac-
tical constraints like the budget constraint. The authors of
[1], [12], [13] propose a class of promising research works
under a given budget constraint to solve the users’ selfishness
for crowdsourcing market applications. Their incentive mech-
anisms enhance user participation levels and guarantee users’
truthful bids. Although it is so promising, the privacy and
security issues is neglected. Consequently, users are reluctant
to disclosing their bid information to others as well as the
platform since this may reflect their true valuation on the
sensing subtasks, and they are not willing to disclose their
sensing subtasks’ selection to others as well since this reveal
their preferences.
Recently, privacy preserving mechanisms have been exten-
sively explored in crowdsourcing applications. The authors
of [14] and [15] apply the spacial and temporal cloaking
techniques to preserve users’ privacy. Their mechanisms blur
the participant’s location at a specific time in a cloaked area
or cloaked time interval to achieve the privacy requirements.
Most of these research works are based on k-anonymity
[16], where a user’s location is cloaked among k − 1 other
users. Further, the authors of [17]–[19] explore the the privacy
protecting in crowdsourcing applications. The authors of [17]
apply the idea of user privacy regulation in crowdsourcing
applications. In [18] and [19], the authors focus on with
how users submit the assignments to the platform without
disclosing their identity. They do not account for the following
collusion and chatting, which may still cause more privacy
leakage. Different from the process of the above anonymous
data collection, the authors in [5] preserves the privacy of users
by introducing the obvious transfer [20]. However, they do not
account for the verifiability of user inputs and outcomes.
Additionally, a security verification issue from the payment
of the platform is also a vital factor faced by the above
promising incentive mechanism for crowd sensing applica-
tions. For example, the authors of [21], [22] apply the proxy
oblivious transfer to verify the output of the platform by
constructing a circuit. The authors of [3] use a timed lapse
cryptography service to keep users’ bids secret from the
auctioneer before the auction closed, and prevent them from
rigging their bid after bidding. But their protocols are rather
expensive, assuming the condition that there is no collusion
between the platform and any user. The authors in [23]
establish secure communication channels to solve security
verification by introducing the random number x generated
by the initiator and y generated by a destination. However,
they do not account for a large of participants that may exist
in crowdsourcing market applications. More importantly, their
works mainly focused on anonymous matching between the
initiator and a destination, which can not be applied directly
to crowdsourcing market applications. Recently, a timed com-
mitment encryption method is adopted to improve the levels
of the payment security from the platform for crowdsourcing
market applications. For instance, The authors of [7], [8], [24]
use the timed commitment to tackle the verifiable security
issues in different aspects. However, these mechanisms are
not applicable in real crowdsourcing market applications with
the budget constraint.
In this paper, to address the above challenges, we first
introduce two incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing mar-
kets with homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs. Then,
we address their privacy preservation of users’ bids and as-
signments by introducing the oblivious transfer. Furthermore,
we design each stage’s threshold payment for homogeneous
jobs and heterogeneous jobs respectively based on the timed
lapse cryptography services to protect users’ privacy. Finally,
we design a general verifiable mechanism to guarantee the
security of the payment from the platform for crowdsourcing
markets with homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we briefly expound some important solution
concepts applied to our privacy-preserving auction mechanism
design, and then present our auction model for crowdsourcing
markets. Finally, we introduce several useful cryptography
tools from the security communications.
A. System Model
We consider the following crowdsourcing market applica-
tion model, illustrated in Fig. 1. The task pricing issue of
our model can be formally as follows: there is a requester
who posts a application to the platform, and then the platform
form a cowdsourcing task requiring n potential users, denoted
U = {u1, u2, · · · , un}. In each task, there are m available
heterogeneous-assignments Γ = {s1, s2, · · · , sm}, that is, si
3Requesters
Application
Task Distribution 
Service
Reputation 
Feedback
Su
bm
it 
ou
tc
om
es
Platform
users
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Fig. 2. Our heterogeneous-assignment based auction scenario.
(i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}) are the assignments in crowdsourcing mar-
kets. Each user ui associates a private cost bi for performing
a single assignment as well as a assignment number limit ti
he is willing to perform, specially t1 = 1, t2 = 1, · · · , tn = 1
for each user in crowdsourcing markets with homogeneous
jobs. That is, for a user ui we do not learn about a priori
what bi, at most ti assignments can be allocated to ui and the
payment for assignment has to exceed bi for guaranteeing the
individual rationality. The platform has a public budget B and
utility function f(S) =
∑
i∈S vi, where vi is the value the
platform assigns for each assignment. For ease of simplicity,
assume that vi = 1, vi ∈ Γ. The platform simply aims to
maximize the number of assignments worked on. The goal of
our mechanism is not only to allocate assignments to users
in a manner that maximizes a utility function on subsets of
sensing tasks under the given budget constraint B, but also to
achieve privacy preservation and verification.
B. Auction Model
We model the interactive process of each task’s assignments
as a sealed-bid auction between the platform and users (see
Fig. 2), in which there is a platform residing in the cloud,
a group of bidders, and an auction issuer (AI). A set of as-
signments Γ publicized by the platform during the deadline T
are auctioned to n users in crowdsourcing market application.
Each user ui submits his encrypted assignment subset Γi and
his corresponding encrypted bid bi(Γi). The AI is semihonest
(passive or curious) only checks the platform randomly. This
will be further illustrated in Section IV.
C. Bulletin Board
Our mechanism exploits a bulletin board abstraction (i.e., all
parties post some auction details to a common area) that can be
constructed applying standard cryptographic techniques. We
compute the communication overheads of our mechanism as
the amount of auction details posted on the bulletin board. It
is worth noting that a robust bulletin board is required for our
crowdsourcing market applications. Therefore our mechanism
can just utilize standard broadcast techniques.
D. Adversarial Model
In the auction process with the budget constraint, the
platform is supposed to know only the currently allocated
winners, their sensing task subsets, and the corresponding
payment. Each user ui only learns whether he is the winner
when he leaves, and he is paid if he is a winner. He does not
know anything about others’ bids or the corresponding task
subsets except for the very limited implicit information in the
payment from the platform.
We assume that the platform and users are semi-honest
adversaries in our mechanism. That is, the platform are inter-
ested in inferring each user’s private information with users no
matter he is a winner or not. Users try to infer others’ sensing
task subsets and the corresponding bids to maximize their own
utilities. Besides, the platform and users can also collude with
each other. According to our online auction model, we give
the analysis of the privacy in our framework below.
Definition 1: Assume that during the online auctions, there
are a random communication string C and its output, an
adversary’s advantage over the privacy information ζi of user
ui is defined as Advi = Pr[ζi|C, Output] = Pr[ζi|Output],
where Pr[ζi] is the probability that a correct ζi is inferred.
E. Problem Formulation
In our above auction model, the platform determines the
set of winners A′ ⊆ U , sensing task allocation ~a =
(t1, t2, · · · , tn), and the charging profile ~p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn).
If user ui is a member of winners set S, the utility of user
ui is pi − bi, where pi is the payment from the platform.
Otherwise, its utility is zero. As such, the utility of the platform
is
∑
sj∈∪i∈SΓi
vj −
∑
i∈S pi is the value that the assignment
tj has to the platform. We assume that the users are rational.
The objective of each bidder is to maximize her utility and
she has no preference over different outcomes with equivalent
utility. The overall objective of the auction mechanism is not
only to achieve the maximum utility value, i.e., maxV (S),
satisfying the budget constraint B, but also to guarantee
privacy preservation and verification between the platform and
users.
However, the above maximal problem will bring many
security and privacy issues including users’ bids and their
assignment selections. Since users are reluctant to disclose
all these privacies to others as well as the platform. On the
other hand, both the winning users and the platform should
be able to verify the payment provided by our mechanisms.
Thus, the overall objective of the auction mechanism is not
4only to achieve the maximum utility value, i.e., maxV (S),
satisfying the budget constraint B, but also to guarantee
privacy preservation and verification between the platform and
users.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING VERIFIABLE INCENTIVE
MECHANISM FOR CROWDSOURCING MARKETS
A. Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Markets
In this section, we introduce two incentive mechanism for
crowdsourcing markets with homogeneous jobs and heteroge-
neous jobs respectively. In essence, the pricing mechanism for
crowdsourcing market applications requires the truthfulness,
computationally effectiveness, budget feasibility and approxi-
mation. Singer et al. present two incentive mechanisms meet-
ing the four conditions well. Their mechanisms are illustrated
as follows.
1) Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Markets with
homogeneous jobs: Consider the following allocation rule
Fm: Sort the n bids conducted by n users so that b1 ≤ b2 ≤
· · · ≤ bn, and consider the largest k so that bk ≤ B/k. That is,
k is the place where the curve of the increasing costs intersects
the hyperbola B/k.The set allocated here is {1, 2, · · · , k}.
That is, Fm = {1, 2, · · · , k}. This is obviously a monotone
allocation rule: a user can not excluded when decreasing
his bid. In [1], the authors design the following incentive
mechanism for crowdsourcing markets with homogeneous jobs
and show the mechanism satisfies the above four conditions.
Theorem 1: [Incentive Mechanism for Homogeneous
Jobs [1]] Firstly, sorting the users’ bids: satisfying b1 ≤ b2 ≤
· · · ≤ bn. Then find the largest integer k such that bk ≤ B/k.
Finally, determine the set of users {1, 2, · · · , k} is the set of
winners, and provide same payment pi = min{B/k, bk+1}.
Obviously, the mechanism has not any security and privacy
preservation measures, and it is one of the challenges that we
will solve in the following section.
2) Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Markets with
Heterogeneous Jobs: Although the above mechanism is so
important, but it only applies for crowdsourcing markets with
homogeneous jobs. To address this issue, recently, the authors
of [2] present a new incentive mechanism for determining
near-optimal prices of tasks for crowdsourcing market with
heterogeneous jobs. Their mechanism is illustrated as follows:
Theorem 2: [Incentive Mechanism for Heterogeneous
Jobs [2]] Firstly, sorting the users’ bids: satisfying b1 ≤
b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bn. Then find the largest integer k such
that bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i tj . Finally, determine the set of users
{1, 2, · · · , k} is the set of winners, and provide same payment
min{B/
∑
j≤i tj , bi+1/ti+1}.
However, similarly, the above maximal problem under
the given budget constraint will also bring many security
and privacy issues including users’ bids and their subtask
set selection. Since users are reluctant to disclose all these
privacies to others as well as the platform. On the other
hand, Both the winning users and the platform should be
able to verify the payment provided by our mechanisms. In
the following section, we will design a privacy-preserving
verifiable incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing market with
homogeneous and heterogeneous jobs according to the above
novel truthful auction scheme.
B. System Initialization and Cryptographic Schemes
In this section, we introduce the constructions of time-lapse
cryptography service, blinded digital signature, and oblivious
transfer for our privacy preservation verifiable auction mech-
anism.
1) Time-Lapse Cryptography Service: In our proposed
mechanism we apply timed commitments on subtask selec-
tions for hiding the users’ selection preferences, i.e., subtask
set selections, until the end of each stage. Cryptographic
methods, as presented in [25] can be used to implement the
timed-commitments. Considering the computation efficiency
reasons, we choose a time lapse cryptography (TLC) service
from [26], which makes it possible to use commitments with
the classical hiding and binding properties. Besides, it prevents
users from refusing to reveal committed subtask selections and
also preventing the platform from dropping received commit-
ments, claiming not to have been able to reveal the committed
subtask selections. we assume that there is an auction issuer
(AI), acting as the TLC service provider, publishes a public
key of a non-malleable encryption scheme, and sends the
corresponding private key only when the auctions of each stage
ends.
Whenever timed commitments on subtask selections are
applied in our mechanism it means that a user encrypts her
subtask selections applying the AI-generated public encryption
key. The encrypted subtask set is known by the platform after
receiving the corresponding private key at the end of each
stage.
2) Blinded Digital Signature: In our work, each user is
a signer who is introduced only to keep the confidentiality
of its the following transformed bid and sensing subtask
selection to the platform as well as other users. Considering
the security, not all digital signature schemes can be used. To
these goals, we apply the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme
[27] (see Algorithm 1). Notably, we do not need the signer
to verify the authenticity of them, and on the other hand the
platform can obtain their transformed bids and sensing subtask
selections from all signers. For the ease of exposition, we will
refer to signi(m) as the signature of the message m from
the user ui in the rest of this paper. Note that the signature
scheme requires the message to be an integer, therefore, we
need to apply sign(⌊10km⌋) for the input m if m is not an
integer like the bid, where k can be appropriately chosen to
preserve the rank from {3, 4, · · · } and ψ(x) denotes the output
of the signature scheme. At the same time, we removes the
signature by using 10−ksign−1(cm), where cm is obtained by
the signature cm = signi(m). For ease of exposition, in the
rest of the paper, we assume that the value of the signature is
an integer. According to [6], the deviation for the roundness of
the signature is negligible. Thus, our assumption is reasonable.
3) Oblivious Transfer for Privacy Preservation: Oblivious
transfer is a paradigm of secret exchange between two parties,
5Algorithm 1 Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Signature.
1: Initialize a prime number p, a prime factor q of p-1, and
an element g ∈ Z∗p with order q;
2: The signer selects k˜ ∈ Zp and sends r˜ = gk˜(mod p) to
signee;
3: The signee randomly chooses α ∈ Zq , β ∈ Z∗q , computes
r = mgα(mod p) and m˜ = rβ−1(mod q) until m˜ ∈ Z∗q .
Then, he sends m˜ to the signer;
4: The signer computes s˜ = m˜x+ k˜(mod q) and sends s˜ to
the signee;
5: The signee computes s˜ = s˜β + α(mod q), and the pair
(r, s) is the the signature for m;
6: Check whether m = g−syrr(mod q) to verify the correct-
ness.
a user and a platform. The user can achieve one of n secrets
from the user, without knowing any information about the rest
of n secrets, while the platform has no idea which of the n
secrets is accessed. Our work employs an efficient 1-out-of-z
oblivious transfer of integers [28]. The detailed description is
given in the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Oblivious Transfer (OT 1n).
1: Initialization: System parameters: (g, h,Gg); the AI’s in-
put: m1,m2, · · · ,mn ∈ Gg; user ui’s choice: α, 1 ≤ α ≤
n;
2: User ui sends y = grhα;
3: The AI replies with ci = (gki ,mi(y/hi)ki), ki ∈R Zq,
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4: By cα = (a, b), user ui computes mα = b/ar;
C. Design Details
During the above two auction mechanisms for crowdsourc-
ing market with homogeneous and heterogeneous jobs, we
need to choose a set of winners and finish the payment of the
winners according to the mechanism with the given budget
constraint. The detailed descriptions are described below.
1) Initialization: The platform invites the AI to participate
in the auction and sends the following information to him:
the crowdsourcing task identifier TID of the platform, the
deadline T , and the timed-lapse encryption key TPK to be
used by all users in commitments. If the AI accepts them, he
set the probability of the auditions from the users as α so that
α ≥ pmax/(f + pmax), where pmax and f are the maximal
payment and fines paid from the platform respectively, and
send signed α and signed auction details to the platform.
If the platform accepts it, the platform posts them on the
bulletin board. Finally, our mechanism also define a set of
possible bids of each stage as β = {β1, β2, · · · , βz} and a set
of possible assignment values χ = {χ1, χ2, · · · , χv}, where
β1 < β2 < · · · < βz and χ1 < χ2 < · · · < χv hold, and
require that each user ui’s marginal-utility-per-bid bi ∈ β and
maximal assignment values ti ∈ χ. The AI maps each bid
value βi and χi to γi and τi respectively, while preserving the
rank, i.e., satisfying γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γn and τ1 < τ2 <
· · · < τn. Similarly, users’ bids and maximal assignments
of the crowdsourcing market application are transformed by
using the order preserving encryption scheme (OPES) [29] for
preserving their ranks. To this end, we assume that the above
AI can boostrap the crowdsourcing market application. All of
the above data are posted on the bulletin board, accompanied
by the platform’s signature signs.
2) Commitment: Each user ui chooses a bid bi and a
maximal assignment value ti according to his valuation he
preferences, and then interacts with the AI. According to the
Algorithm 2, each user ui receives b˜i = γx and his maximal
assignment t˜i = τx, which are the rank-preserving-encrypted
values of βx and χx respectively. Then each user ui encrypts
the encrypted bid and assignment as ei = EKppub(b˜i|t˜i|ri)
by using the platform’s Paillier encryption key Kppub and a
randomly chosen values ri. User ui then makes a commitment
ci = ETPK(ei|si|TID), where si is a randomly generated bit
string for the proof of correctness and TID is the auction iden-
tifier ID. Finally, the user signs this commitment, and sends
a bidding request BR = (i, ci, signi(ci|TID)) to platform
and then checks BR’s validity. If the BR passes the check,
the platform returns a signed receipt Ri = signp(ci|TID|T )
(see Fig. 3, step 1©). Otherwise, it is discarded. Before
time t, the platform posts all the received true commitments
c1, c2, · · · , cn on the bulletin board. Then, the platform inter-
acts with the AI and receives the encrypted value B˜′ and B˜ for
the budget constraint B′ and ⌊(B′ −
∑
j∈A tj)/p⌋ by using
the Algorithm 2.
3) Decommitment: Between time T and T + δ, for any
user who has a receipt for a bid which is not posted or has
a receipt unable to pass this consistent check (see Fig. 3,
step 1©), he can appeal his non-inclusion, reporting to the AI
if she has used them. At time T + δ, each party, including
the platform and all users, can recover each encrypted bid-
assignment pair ei as well as each random string ri by
employing the description key TSK posted by the AI. The
platform recovers the pair for computing the auction results
and random values r1, · · · , rk for the proofs of correctness
by applying the platform decryption key. The platform then
computes the set of winners and their corresponding payments
from the platform according to the above auction mechanism
with the given budget constraint. The platform posts the
winner’s identity and the encrypted payment information to be
made by the platform, and information for any party verifying
the correct results on the bulletin board.
(a)Winners Selection: In this stage, our goal of the winners’
selection is to find the user uk with the biggest integer k
so that bk ≤ B/
∑k
i=1 ti holds, thereby obtain the set of the
winners. Firstly, the platform first recovers the bids b˜i and t˜i
from the bulletin board and then the platform sorts users’ all
encrypted bids from the sampling set and then the platform
resorts to the AI to fetch the original value b1 and t1 of
b˜1 and t˜1: b1 = OPENS−1(b˜1); t1 = OPENS−1(t˜1). If
bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i tj holds, then user ui is a winner, the largest
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Fig. 3. Our privacy-preservation verifiable auction phase for online crowd sensing.
number k is i− 1 otherwise. When user ui is added to the set
of winners, the platform then computes bi ← OPENS−1(b˜i)
and t˜i ← min{OPENS−1(t˜i), τ˜i}. The iteration is repeated
until our goal is achieved. The set of winners {1, 2, · · · , k}
is found. Notable, when we determine the largest k, if
bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i tj does not hold, the k + 1-th user’s bids and
assignments may be disclosed (see Fig. 3, step 4©). Since in
our online crowdsourcing market applications, we assume that
the number of users is much larger than the number k. As such,
our scheme satisfies k-anonymity. So, neither the agent, nor
the platform, can identify any bidder’s assignments with the
probability higher than 1/k. The detailed description is given
in the Algorithm 3.
(b)Payment Decision: In the payment determination
phase, we compute the same payment pi for each win-
ner i ∈ A. The same payment and the last user’s as-
signment are p = min{B/
∑
j≤i tj , bi+1/ti+1} and ti =
min{OPENS−1(t˜i), τi} respectively. In particular, when
jobs performed by users are homogeneous, the same payment
p = min{B/k, bi+1} and each winner only has an assignment.
The details are given in Algorithm 3.
4) Verification: Since our mechanism is truthful, we only
need to verify the winners and the corresponding payment of
the platform, that is, any of the users can verify the outcome
of the auction on her own. This can be done in a “zero
knowledge” fashion, without revealing anything about the any
bid bi and assignments’ selection ti except that implied by
the outcome of the auction. To this end, user ui requests AI
to verify the payment outcome with the probability α. After
the AI receives the request, he asks for the random value
ri of each user’s ei. Then he derives each user ei’s b˜i, t˜i
by decrypting ei on the bulletin board with ri, thereby the
payment is obtained according to the above auction details
and the information from the bulletin board. He sends the
payment pi and his assignments t
′
i to the user ui to verify the
correctness of the outcomes from the platform,thereby obtains
the user’s feedback to determine whether to fine the platform
(see Fig. 4). Further transparency can be provided by a digital
signature, so that the platform indicate that every user accept
the outcome. Otherwise, the platform can prove the outcome to
be correct by publicly revealing it. In summary, our mechanism
Algorithm 3 A General Privacy-preservation Verifiable Auc-
tion mechanism under the budget constraint(G-PVA)
Input: Anonymous users’ set S, the budget constraint B.
Output: (S, p).
// Phase 1: Winner selection
1: Initialize: sort S ′ i.e., b˜1 < b˜2 · · · < b˜|S|;A ← ∅; i = 1;
2: b1 ← OPENS−1(b˜1); t1 ← 1;
3: if jobs are heterogeneous then
4: t1 ← OPENS−1(t˜1);
5: end if
6: while bi ≤ B/
∑
j≤i tj do
7: A ← A∪ i;
8: i← i+ 1;
9: bi ← OPENS−1(b˜i); t1 ← 1;
10: if jobs are heterogeneous then
11: ti ← min{OPENS−1(t˜i), τi}, where τi = ⌊(B
′
−
bi
∑
j∈A tj)/bi⌋;
12: end if
13: end while
// Phase 2: Payment determination
14: for each user i ∈ A do
15: if jobs are heterogeneous then
16: pi ← min{B/
∑
j∈A tj , bi+1/ti+1};
17: end if
18: pi ← min{B/k, bi+1};
19: end for
20: return (S, p);
AIUsers
Commitment Round
Decommitment Round
Initialization Parameters
Verification Request
Verify Fine
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Fig. 4. Our privacy-preservation verifiable auction framework.
must ensure that the platform operates correctly and does not
try to cheat.
7V. PRIVACY AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Privacy of Users
Lemma 1: Algorithm G-PVA is privacy-preserving for
users.
Proof: In Algorithm G-PVA, there are two central author-
ities, including the platform and the AI. When the platform
performs the winners’ selection, it only can knows the (k+1)-
th user’s bid and assignments, but does not know which user
it belongs to. In the stage of verification, similarly, the AI
also knows the (k+1)-th user’s bid and assignments, and does
not know which user it belongs to. The AI and the platform
only knows the encrypted bids, but have no way to decrypt
any of them. No other party can get even more information
than the platform or the AI. On one hand, user ui gets his
bid b˜i = γx and his maximal assignment t˜i = τx through
a 1-out-of-z oblivious transfer from the AI, who is unaware
of which γx and τx have benn accessed by the user. user
ui sends the encrypted bid ei to the AI, who cannot decrypt
ei without knowing the private key of asymmetric encryption
scheme. Even if the AI may know the (k+1)-th user’s bid
and assignments later when the platform consults him, he still
cannot infer its user owning to the nounce. Thus, the AI cannot
know the user of (k+1)-th user.
Additionally, although the platform can obtain the the (k+1)-
th user’s bid and assignments later, he can only reversely with
the help of the AI. However, the platform still can not derive
the user, to which (k+1)-th user’s bid and assignments belongs
out of at least k members according to the Theorem 3.2 in [1]
due to a large number of users much larger than k exiting in
the crowdsourcing markets.
Therefore, neither the AI, nor the platform, can know any
user’s bid and assgnments with the probability higher than
1/k. Obviously, the lemma holds.
B. Payment Security
Theorem 3: The proposed algorithm G-PVA is correct for
a rational platform.
Proof: Correctness of the G-PVA follows from the as-
sumption that the assumption that the platform is rational and
the fine that he pays when checked cheating is high enough. If
his expected utility when complying with the G-PVA is higher
than his expected utility from his deviation he will abide by
the algorithm, as such the proposed algorithm G-PVA will be
correct. We will show the probability α that the platform’s
incorrect payment will not be checked by the user with the
help of the AI, set by the algorithm G-PVA, ensures that
the platform’s expected utility is non-positive. The detailed
derivation is given as follows. α ≥ pmax/(f + pmax) ⇒
(1 − α)pmax − αf ≤ 0. Considering the platform’s expected
utility, i.e., (1−α)V++αV−, where V+ denotes the platform’s
utility when it gives incorrect payment but is not checked
by the users, and V− denotes the platform’s utility when it
gives incorrect payment but is checked by the users. Again,
pmax ≥ V+ and −f = V−, according to the outcome of
the above derivation, further, we have (1 − α)V+ + αV− ≤
(1−α)pmax−αf ≤ 0. Thus, if the platform does not comply
with the algorithm G-PVA, its expected utility is non-positive.
As such, for a rational platform, it is willing to abide by the
rules of the algorithm G-PVA, and gives a correct payment for
every user. Finally, Theorem 3 holds.
Theorem 4: The users in Algorithm G-PVA is truthful.
Proof: For the proof we apply the outcome of the
homogenous jobs presented by Singer et al. [1]. We extend
the proof outcome to the heterogeneous jobs.
The allocation in Algorithm G-PVA is monotone, since
declaring a lower cost advances an item in the increasing
sorting. To see that θi is indeed the payment for all i ∈ A.
Consider first the case where bk+1 ≤ B/
∑
j≤k tj . Declaring
a bid b′i > bk+1 places i after user k + 1. Since all users
in (A\{i}) ∪ {k + 1} have bids less than {B/
∑
j≤k tj} as
the algorithm G-PVA reaches user ui’s bid, there are already
(at least) k users ahead of user ui. Since b′i > bk+1 >
B/
∑
j≤k+1 tj , user ui is declared a loser. Declaring a cost
below bk+1 places user ui within the first k items, all with
bids less than B/
∑
j≤k tj , and thus user ui will be allocated.
In case bk+1 ≥ B/
∑
j≤k tj , declaring a bid b
′
i >
B/
∑
j≤k tj places at least k−1 items ahead of user ui, since
all items in the winning set have cost less than B/
∑
j≤k tj .
Therefore, even if user ui will be considered by the mechanism
it will not be allocated as it does not meet the mechanism’s
allocation condition. Declaring a lower cost ensures that user
ui is placed within the first k items and it will be allocated.
The payment rule therefore respects the threshold property and
we conclude that the mechanism is indeed truthful.
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